#11 Inside the Indo Pacific: Chaos in Kashmir

INTRO

RYAN: 

Welcome back guys! Before we get started on this episode, we are proud to announce the launch of our new website — geopoliticsrundown.com. 

The website has links to all of our social media, and it makes it easier for folks who want to read the scripts of our podcast episodes and check out the sources we used. Also, it’s a great way to get in touch with us! For this episode, we highly recommend you visit our website and look at the maps we’ve provided, which will help you to better understand the geography of today’s topic.

With that said, let’s get going with our episode today.

RAMYA:

So we’re finally getting to talk about the Indopacific, an area of mounting importance in the world, and we figured this current story out of India and China would be a great way to introduce the region. 

So what is the Indopacific? It’s a vast swathe of land and water, stretching from the east coast of Africa, through the Indian Ocean, and across the pacific, with China in the North and Australia to the south. There are two distinct spheres in this region- the Indian ocean and surrounding areas, and the South China Sea in the Pacific, separated by the Malacca straits. The Indopacific is vital to both international trade and security, because it contains more than half the world’s population, six countries with nuclear weapons, along with 9 of the world’s ten busiest ports, through which 60% of all global maritime trade goes through. 

General Map of the Region Credit: Your Free Templates

HUNTER:

Because of how important it is, you see a lot of different states with opposing interests all interacting with one another in the region. One such country is the US. The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report by the US Department of Defense stated that the Indo-Pacific is the single most consequential region for America’s future. Many other countries are also shifting their focuses towards the Indopacific, and locals like India and China are trying to capitalize on that interest to maximize their returns and gain more influence.  

RYAN:

That’s why, in this episode, we will unpack the recent and historical tensions between India and China. The two share a checkered past as geostrategic rivals, and are both rising world powers. We’ve talked a lot about China on this show, but we really haven’t talked about India, which does, in some way, speak to India’s reputation as a country that can get overlooked by most people. We’re going to tell you about why you should pay more attention to India, because they’re currently on their way to becoming a dominant force in the Indopacific. 

RAMYA:

It’s a story that flew under the radar for months but is now a top headline. According to reports, the conflict began in early May when Chinese troops began camping in an Indian-controlled part of the Himalayas. It didn’t start a shooting war, but it still turned deadly. Skirmishes broke out where the soldiers pelted each other with rocks, beat each other with rebar, and even shoved each other off cliffs.

By June 6th Indian and Chinese foreign officials agreed to ease tensions at the border — but unfortunately, news reports surfaced this past week that another skirmish had broken out, and 20 Indian soldiers had died. While Chinese state-run news has not disclosed the number of Chinese injuries or deaths, it is widely assumed that Chinese soldiers suffered casualties as well.

HUNTER:

These incidents are a part of a larger ongoing dispute over the China-India border. However, this is a significant escalation in the history of border disputes between India and China. It has acutely strained relations between the two nuclear armed powers.

While there have been many border disputes between the two countries, those conflicts have often ended in mutual agreements to peace. However, this is the first time that Indian soldiers have died at the hands of Chinese troops since 1975. 

And it speaks to a broader pattern of Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and in this particular case, in South Asia. To India, this is a serious strategic threat. 

WHAT’S THE STORY?

HUNTER:

So let’s dig into this a little deeper. What’s the story here? 

RYAN:

Let’s start at the beginning of this particular conflict. On May 6th, Chinese troops made deep forays into Indian held territory on the disputed border in Kashmir, called the Line of Actual Control or the LAC. They met Indian forces in multiple locations: the north shore of Pangong Tso Lake and later in Naku La in Sikkim, as well as in the Galwan Valley, Kemchok, and Hot Springs. 

HUNTER:

So why have the two countries failed to reach an agreement this time around?

RAMYA:

Here’s what’s preventing another agreement for peace. China stated that Indian soldiers attacked them on Chinese land, but Indian military officials said that they never maneuver their forces anywhere outside of Indian territory. As of right now, no talks have been held between the two sides to come to another understanding. 

HUNTER: 

So why is China being so aggressive at the border with India? 

RYAN:

Well this isn’t new. India and China share a long history of border disputes, skirmishes, and even war. There are two areas of contention: the regions in Kashmir, which is to the north of India, between Pakistan and China, and the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is to the East of India, near Tibet. When India became an independent country in 1947, it had to contend with convoluted demarcations of territory drawn by colonists — especially when it came to separating one India into India and Pakistan. Through that partition, India’s northernmost region Kashmir became bitterly contested by India, Pakistan and China, each of whom the British had promised that land. As it currently stands, the historic boundaries of the region are contentiously split between all three. 

Disputed Territories Credit: The Economist

Further east, near Bhutan and Myanmar, is Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state that China claims as its own. This goes back to when China invaded and annexed Tibet in 1951, a region that they believe included Arunachal Pradesh. 

HUNTER: 

If all of this sounds confusing, listeners, you can find maps of this area on our website that can put this into context a bit. But back to the issue, I’m assuming that the situation in Tibet contributed to strained relations between India and China. 

RAMYA:

You assumed correctly! In 1959, 8 years after China took Tibet, the Tibetan people started an uprising that turned violent when China subsequently crushed it. The Dalai Lama and his government fled to India and established a government in exile. This became the catalyst that led India and China to go to war in 1962.

China became enraged, and declared Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory, saying it was historically part of Tibet. In 1961, Chinese troops began patrolling the McMahon Line, which is the border that separates Arunachal Pradesh from China. India responded by enacting the defensive Forward Policy, and built outposts on the Chinese side of the border to force Chinese troops to return home. Several violent skirmishes later, the McMahon line became the setting for the war. 

The Sino-Indian War was a border conflict not unlike the ones the two countries just engaged in – it escalated to a much higher degree. China engaged India along the LAC and around the McMahon Line, and was able to claim victory in the conflict, gaining kms of new territory. 

Since then, there have been skirmishes here and there, but the loss of that war has motivated India’s national defense policy for the last 60 years. 

HUNTER:

That brings us back to today. Why do you think China took the first step in the recent border skirmish? 

RYAN:

It is highly likely that Chinese troops crossed the LAC because India has been building a road called the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road which goes right alongside the LAC. India is using this road to secure its side of the border and to increase military access in that region. China sees this as an Indian attempt to regain Aksai Chin, China’s Kasmiri territory, as the road at a certain point is less than 10 km away from Aksai Chin

The DSDBO Road Credit: India Defense Review

RAMYA:

It isn’t just the road though. A recent report published by a Chinese state-run think tank posited that these skirmishes are possibly due to India’s decision to end the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, effectively putting the whole region under New Delhi’s control. Such a change will certainly pave the way for more projects like the D-S-DBO road and a higher military presence there in general. 

HUNTER:

So you might be thinking that the situation seems pretty clear cut. India is ramping up its military capabilities at the border to catch up to China, who is intent on freezing the current situation where it has the advantage. 

REALISM: BALANCING

RYAN:

You are right, but there’s a bigger picture to this situation. One of the goals of this show is to give our listeners a simplified look into the tools that foreign policy professionals use to make decisions. This is the perfect opportunity to introduce some of the theory of international relations, especially the theory of realism. Realism is a school of international relations that focuses on how states interact, especially in a military context. 

HUNTER:

Basically, this theory views all countries as rational actors in an anarchic system whose policy decisions are driven by the need to maximize their own security. Think lord of the flies or hunger games, where it’s everyone for themselves and trust is rare. To that end, realism views alliances as tools to maximize a state’s power relative to the states that threaten it.

RAMYA:

This region–the Indo Pacific–is a classic example of realism in context. You have China, a rising regional power, or hegemon, that is quickly gaining power relative to its region, both economically and militarily, such that no single country can resist China’s influence alone. 

That leaves China’s neighboring states with two choices – either ally with the rising power, giving up some autonomy, or ally with other states and collectively balance against China. In international affairs, this demonstrates a concept called balance of power. 

RYAN:

The idea is that states will naturally shift their alliances to prevent any one country from becoming dominant. And that’s the situation that India finds itself in. India, for many reasons, is opposed to joining China and allowing too much Chinese influence into the country. So, India’s best option is to find allies. There are many others in the region that feel the same way– other democracies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea are among them. This is exactly the sort of situation they teach in entry level foreign affairs classes, because it reflects the realist theory that international politics is fundamentally about securing and maintaining power.

HUNTER: 

So basically, China is trying to intimidate and even manipulate everybody into jumping on their bandwagon, all in an effort to prevent states from balancing against it. How does that lead to the skirmishes?

RYAN:

Skirmishes are part of a larger pattern that we see in China’s behavior, where it has taken numerous steps to box in India, as a way to prevent it from effectively balancing against China’s regional power.

India is China’s biggest rival in the Indopacific, due to its geography, economy, its nuclear capabilities, and even more importantly, strong bilateral relations with countries across the globe that China views as threats- including the United States. They’ve maintained a rivalry in the region for decades, stemming back to the Sino-Indian War. 

Over the years, China did not consider India as that big of a threat, especially after delivering that crushing loss in 62. 

RAMYA:

China underestimated India in the past, but the situation has changed —  particularly in the past twenty years. As early as 2000, Condoleezza Rice wrote about India being crucial in dealing with China. India also experienced skyrocketing economic growth for years, and has built up its military in that time. Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing BJP government has been in power, India has carefully inserted itself into the global geopolitical system, and has worked on forming alliances with countries like Japan, Australia and the United States. This has, without a doubt, threatened China in several ways.

HUNTER:

So is that why China is boxing in India?

RYAN:

Exactly. What it really comes down to is that China now views India as not just a pest at the border, but a serious regional rival–both economically and militarily. Both countries have made the calculation that they each have the potential to become the dominant force in the Indopacific, but there’s only enough room for one of them on top. 

USE of BRI + MARITIME SILK ROAD

HUNTER:

And how is China going about boxing in India? 

RAMYA:

That’s a great question. 

China’s goal is to expand Chinese influence across the region, which ends up being to India’s detriment, as it would be isolating India from its neighbors. This would happen as a part of China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. 

BRI, also referred to as the New Silk Road, is China’s grand plan to build a network of highways, railways, sea ports, energy pipelines and other infrastructure going westward, connecting Asia with Europe and Africa. It has both land and sea components, the latter being known as the Maritime Silk Road. Both of these initiatives are equally important. 

RYAN:

China carries out the massive project by loaning smaller countries the capital for much needed infrastructure or development projects. The catch is that China uses the debt these countries incur during construction to gain premier access to these infrastructure projects and use them for their own advantage. 

This tremendously increases China’s economic influence since these countries will be in debt to China, and the projects themselves would increase trade, and therefore, benefit China’s economy. Some experts posit that it might give China a military advantage.  

RAMYA:

Beijing is offering BRI projects to India’s neighbors in hopes to lure them into China’s influence and away from India. China wants to cause a domino effect of bandwagoning amongst South Asian countries, where they all together realize that China, and not India, will be their most beneficial partnership. 

This strategy, which experts call China’s String of Pearls, has been, for the most part, successful, and the goal is to give China control over various points of strategic interest (the pearls) throughout South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China can chain these “pearls” together to create a giant network that completely bypasses Indian influence. Most of India’s neighbors are now hosts to BRI projects, with varying degrees of Chinese influence. 

India’s “String of Pearls” Credit Unknown – Please contact us if this is your graphic

HUNTER:

Could you give us a few examples of India’s neighbors that are under Chinese influence?

RYAN:

Absolutely. Of all of India’s neighbors, Pakistan is China’s biggest ally. They have been friendly ever since Pakistan recognized the PRC and denounced Taiwan in 1950.

The BRI installation in Pakistan is known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and stretches from the northern tip of the country to its southern foot at the port city of Gwadar. Gwadar is incredibly important, and the plan is that it will be the crown jewel of CPEC upon its completion. China has built a series of roads and pipelines that links Gwadar directly to Xinjiang in China. 

The benefit of the CPEC to China is direct access to the Arabian Sea. Gwadar allows China to easily transport oil from the Middle East and allows easy access to East Africa. This is strategically vital to China, since it would otherwise have to transport the oil its economy depends on through the straits of malacca and through the South China Sea — which leaves China vulnerable.

But there’s a problem — that road passes through Kashmir (Upenn). By building this project, China effectively endorses Pakistan’s claim to the region, creating another flashpoint in an already volatile standoff.

RAMYA:

Another example is Bangladesh, who like Pakistan, shares a border with India. Even though it is less inclined towards China than Pakistan, Bangladesh sees an opportunity to gain from India and China’s growing rivalry, who both wish to gain influence over it. 

As another member of the BRI system, Bangladesh has been receiving $38b in loans from 27 different agreements, which has pried away India’s long standing status as #1 investor in Bangladesh. 

Like Pakistan with Gwadar, Bangladesh is working on two big ports in Payra and Cox Bazaar, with highways and railways that connect them to China. Many India experts fear that these ports will serve China’s economic and military interests. To go along with those fears, the Bangladeshi military trains frequently with their Chinese counterparts, and China is Bangladesh’s largest weapon supplier. All this adds up to Bangladesh leaning more towards China than India, which does little to assuage Indian fears of Chinese encroachment in their sphere of influence. 

HUNTER:

And what about Sri Lanka? I believe it is just off the coast of India and has recent ties to China.

RYAN:

That’s right. As an island nation just off India’s Southeastern coast in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka is in a prime position to capitalize on the massive amount of trade going through the Indo Pacific. China has seen the same opportunity, and extended its BRI initiatives to the island, offering loans to modernize and develop the country’s ports. 

However, Sri Lanka has been unable to pay off those loans, and has instead leased the Hambantota Port to China for 99 years as recompense. The strategic implications of such a deal are massive. China can reap the dividends of trade through the port, while also dangling debt relief in Sri Lanka’s face to potentially allow the use of Chinese naval assets. With the port being within a few hundred km of India, China hopes to use Hambantota as a way to squeeze India out of both Indopacific trade and Indian ocean security. 

HUNTER:

Are there any other countries that India should worry about?

RAMYA:

Since we’re talking about the Indian Ocean, then yes, India has something to worry about in the case of the Maldives. The Maldives are an island chain located further south of India and Sri Lanka, in the middle of the Indian ocean. China has brought BRI to the Maldives, and helped fund the creation of Hulhumale, an artificial island that will serve to expand the central hub of the Maldives. China has also funded the massive “Friendship Bridge” that links Hulhumale to the main island, Male. 

At one point in 2017, three Chinese submarines docked in a Maldives port, which goes to show what could happen if China and India were ever to come to blows. Add up the Maldives with Sri Lanka, and China has two strategic locations in the Indian Ocean through which they can deny India economic opportunities and prevent the Indian Navy free access in the Indian Ocean. 

So through BRI, China is gaining a strong foothold in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. If you consider the locations of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, you can see that China and its “string of pearls” has India encircled and can threaten to cut it off both economically and militarily. It’s far from a strategic alliance like NATO, but it’s majorly concerning to India nonetheless. 

INDIA’S RESPONSE

HUNTER:

So what is India doing about it? How is India handling being “boxed in” by China?

RYAN:

India has had to take both inward and outward measures to ensure that it can balance against the rising China and its new cohort of South Asian beneficiaries. Part of those measures has been to bolster its own military capabilities. 

We’ve already discussed infrastructure projects like the DSDBO road in Kashmir, but India has been doing more than just building roads on the border with China. To begin with, India has purchased more weapons than anyone besides Saudi Arabia since 2012, accounting for nearly 10% of world weapon sales. Some of these purchases have gone towards supporting the Indian navy, the most recent of which were for naval helicopters with anti-submarine capabilities, which are vital to countering the Chinese submarine fleet that is set to become the largest in the world and will outnumber Indian subs 4 to 1. 

HUNTER:

And what is India doing to prevent being “choked” by the string of pearls?

RAMYA:
The Indian Navy’s strength has always been paramount to India’s strategic goals in the Indopacific. Most of India’s trade runs through the Indian Ocean, so it’s essential for India to maintain control over the maritime region to prevent being strangled. 

In the past, India was preoccupied by continental threats at its borders. But in the past two decades, perceptions have shifted back to the importance of the Indian Ocean. India has been bolstering its naval capabilities for the past 20 years: they’ve built 3 aircraft carriers, and have developed multiple anti-submarine class ships, and are currently working to develop a robust submarine fleet of their own. 

They’ve also created multiple island outposts in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea off the eastern coast of India. The most notable outpost is the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which serves as India’s frontier military installation. 

HUNTER:

But bolstering its military is only one part of the plan to stop China’s incursions into South Asia and the Indian Ocean, right? I would think that to do that completely, India would have to look outside of South Asia for allies to balance against China’s rising status. 

RYAN:

That’s correct. In that search, India has found allies in the US, Australia, and Japan, all of whom sympathise with the threat China poses. India receives most of its arms from the United States, which is already in a fierce competition with China. We’ve discussed the US-China power struggle ad nauseum throughout our other episodes – so India and the US are a perfect fit for one another. 

HUNTER:

Would you say that the US is India’s preferred ally in this matter?

RYAN:

Yes, due to how provocative that alliance would be to Beijing. It would demonstrate to China that India is not going to back down and let China expand into South Asia and erode India’s territorial integrity. The US also sees India as a crucial democratic state that would maintain free flowing commerce in the Indopacific, which is of vital interest to America’s economic security. In fact, India and the US have been holding joint military exercises for years, and have agreed to let each other use the other’s military bases. 

HUNTER:

In the scope of this threat, has India conducted military exercises with other allies?

RAMYA:

Yes. Japan, and recently Australia have become a part of some of the training exercises, most notably the Malabar exercises held every year. 

Japan, Australia, India and the United States make up an informal group known as the Quadrilateral Dialogue, but they tend to avoid overt actions in an effort to not agitate China. This is because the first iteration of the quad in 2008 fell apart due to Chinese claims that it was a containment strategy against them. 

The quad was revived in 2017, but has been mostly for meetings and setting up the Malabar exercise. Instead, the countries focus on a series of trilateral and bilateral relations, where they each will form different trios and duos of economic and security treaties, all to ensure “a free and open Indopacific”. For example, India, the US, and Japan participate in separate military exercises together, and India, Australia, and Indonesia have security and economic treaties to balance against China. 

RYAN:

Speaking of Indonesia, India has made many diplomatic overtures to Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Vietnam, who also have a history of distrust for China. Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular serve as a gateway from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, so their support will be integral to keeping China’s presence in the Indian Ocean at a minimum. 

HUNTER:

What do you mean by a gateway?

RYAN:

Well, Indonesia is the site of three main straits that serve as the only ways through the Indian Ocean into the Pacific. These are the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits, and are of value to all actors involved — but are particularly important to China. 

75-80% of all Chinese energy imports have to travel through the Malacca straits to get to China, so if India and its allies can be in the position to blockade those straits, they can slowly strangle China through its immense need for oil and gas. China knows this, and it’s part of the reason it wants ports all across the Indian Ocean like Gwadar and Cox Bazaar that can help circumvent what experts call the “Malacca Dilemma”. All of this is part of the giant balancing act that we’ve been talking about. 

Malacca Credit: Your Free Templates

HUNTER:

So just to put this all into context: it sounds like China may have India encircled in South Asia, but India is working to encircle China as well. Indonesia, Australia, Japan, and the US are powerful actors that have the ability to impact China’s goals in the Indopacific, and it seems they are all of like mind on that subject.

But let’s get back to this rivalry between China and India. Guys, what should listeners understand about this conflict, if they remember nothing else?

RAMYA:

Since the beginning of May, India and China have been engaging in a back and forth clash at their shared border in the Indian controlled region of Kashmir. Firearms have not been used, but that hasn’t prevented casualties — during a recent skirmish high in the himalayas, 20 Indian and an indeterminate amount of Chinese soldiers died. Even as we speak, both sides are mobilizing their forces on their own side of the border in preparation for more to come. These border fights are actually a re-emergence of old hostilities between China and India, who have clashed at the border for decades – they even went to war in 1962, which China won. 

The construction of India’s DSDBO road along with New Delhi’s plan to control Kashmir directly threaten China’s military advantage on the border, and are the primary drivers behind the present conflict. While war will not immediately follow these events, they have undoubtedly paved the way for more hostile relations between the two countries and may serve as an indirect cause of conflict in the near future. 

RYAN:

China’s aggression at the border with India is part of a larger strategy to box in India and limit its options, which would leave China free to gain influence throughout South Asia and the Indian Ocean. But India isn’t sitting back and letting it happen. In fact, the two are attempting to negate the other’s actions with their own policies. China is using its gargantuan BRI project to gain access to key strategic ports along the Indian Ocean and cut India out of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, while India is strengthening economic and military ties with the US, Australia, Japan, and Indonesia to balance against China. And both are modernizing their militaries to maximize their influence in the key Indopacific theater, which will be the future of global trade and security. Overall, China and India are caught up in the ever shifting balance of power that will determine which, if either of them, will sit atop the Indopacific in the future. 

HUNTER:

That’s it for our episode today, the first in an ongoing series on the Indo-Pacific region. If you had a hard time visualizing the geography of this episode (I know I did) check out our website geopoliticsrundown.com, the link is in the show notes. We are also on social media, so you can find us on twitter, facebook and instagram. If you enjoyed this episode don’t forget to subscribe on Itunes, Spotify, or however you listen. As always thank you for tuning in, this has been geopolitics…rundown.

2 thoughts

  1. Great read! I listened to the podcast, and not being native English-speaking person, sometimes it can be hard to follow the conversation (even thought you guys are speaking clearly!) so I’m glad there’s an article too so I can easily follow along. Thank you and keep up the good work!

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