#17 UAE-Israel Deal: Frenemies with Benefits

Join the nerds for a discussion on the recent peace deal between Israel and the UAE, the Abraham Accord. Why and how did the deal happen? What does the deal do? Who are the winners and losers? What does it mean for the future of the Middle East? All of those questions and more are answered in this episode of Geopolitics Rundown.

HUNTER:

Intro

Welcome back to the show everyone! First off, we want to thank all of our listeners for supporting the show. We just passed 6500 downloads, and we couldn’t have done that without you. But we want to take this show to the next level–more interviews, more content. So we are actively looking for sponsors and advertisers. If you know any companies or organizations that would be interested in supporting what we do, please reach out to us at geopoliticsrundown@gmail.com or on our website, geopoliticsrundown.com.

Anyway, let’s get into it. So guys, now that we’re done with our Inside the Indo Pacific series, we’re going to transition back into analysing and explaining recent headlines. Today, we’re talking about the recent deal, called the Abraham Accord, which effectively normalizes relations between the United Arab Emirates, or UAE, and Israel. The Trump Administration brokered the deal, and announced it on August 13th, about a week ago. 

RAMYA:

This is huge – if you take a look at the past century or so, pretty much the entirety of the Middle East has been at odds with Israel, since the country’s inception in 1947. We aren’t going to get into the entire history of the Arab-Israeli conflict— that’s an entire episode to itself for another time, and if you guys want us to make an episode on that, we’d be happy to! Please contact us on our website and let us know. 

What we will do today though is walk you through the recent events that led to the deal, what the deal itself is, and what it means for the Middle East going forward. 

HUNTER:

So let’s start with a bit of background on why this deal was necessary?

RYAN:

Sure. So the main event that led to the deal’s formation was Israel’s plan to annex territory in the West Bank. Israel seized the territory after it fought a war against a coalition of Syria, Jordan and Egypt in 1967. The territory has been under dispute since the war ended, and Israel has aimed to chip away at it – initially, it was occupied territory, but it changed over time into full blown Israeli territory through annexation. 

In 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced plans to annex the Jordan Valley and other sections of the West Bank. Take a look at the map we have provided. 

Credit: Al Jazeera

As you can see on the map, the issue is that there are significant Palestinian settlements in the area, and here’s the thing: the settlements and that land would be integral to the formation of an independent Palestinian state. This means that Netanyahu’s plan puts a serious wrench in the potential of a two state solution. 

HUNTER:

You should definitely go into what the two state solution is.

RYAN:

Sure yeah. Okay, so the two state solution. Basically, the Palestinian minority in Israel would form its own state which stand alongside Israel – thus, the two state solution. And it’s part of a larger puzzle to bring peace to the turbulent Middle East, and has always been seen as the only way that Israel could ever have normal relations with its Arab neighbors. However, it’s never gotten off the ground, and it’s hard to say when it would ever do so with Israel’s plans for annexation. 

So when Israel announced annexation plans, it set the stage for their most recent diplomatic venture, which was the Israel – UAE deal. But, as always, there’s more to Israel and the UAE’s relationship than the Abraham Accord. Actually, for over a decade prior to the deal, the two countries have been slowly and informally building ties. Their warmer diplomatic relations are mainly due to their mutual distrust of Iran. It’s kind of like, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” They both don’t like Iran, and they both want the US to be involved and take a hard line against Iran. 

In fact, the two made a joint appeal to newly elected President Barack Obama in 2009, asking for precisely that. Then, in 2015, Israel opened a diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi – the first Israeli diplomatic office in a Gulf state. 

Their relationship has only grown in the wake of the burgeoning Iranian nuclear program, the JCPOA, and the US sanctions against Iran. For more in depth information on this topic, refer to our previous episode on it titled “Maximum Pressure”. 

HUNTER:

So where does this distrust come from? Ramya, do you want to take this?

RAMYA:

Sure! So as you just mentioned, there is a lot of distrust towards Iran. 

Let’s start with Israel. Relations between Israel and Iran have been seriously strained since Iran’s revolution in 1979, which led to the rise of the, you know, the Islamic Republic and the Ayatollah. 

So with that regime change, Iran cut off all diplomatic ties with Israel –  but the break in relations wasn’t really addressed until the 1990’s, when the 2nd Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei came to power and called for Israel’s destruction

Khamenei’s rise to power triggered many of the issues plaguing Israeli-Iranian relations to this day. Like the proxy conflict the two are mired in. We’ve talked about Iran’s proxy warfare capabilities and goals in our Security Sunday episode called “the Notorious IRGC”, but basically: 

Iran funds Shia Islamic terrorist groups across the Middle East, like Hezbollah and Hamas, who then take the fight to Iran’s enemies, namely Israel and the gulf states, destabilizing the region to Iran’s benefit. In response, Israel has retaliated against the insurgent groups and has conducted a number of covert ops, which were mostly to sabotage pipelines and other manufacturing related to Iran’s nuclear program, and even assassinations within Iranian borders. 

HUNTER:

But it’s not just Israel that has it out for Iran is it? 

RYAN:

Definitely not. So in contrast to Israel and Iran’s relationship, which is basically bordering on open war, the UAE and Iran have had comparably warmer relations in the past. However, things are becoming more contentious by the day as of late. 

The two are embroiled in the ongoing war and devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen – on one side, we have the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and on the other side are the Iran-sponsored Houthi rebels. Since 2015, when this conflict began, Emirati-Iranian relations have worsened every day that it continues.  

To go along with that proxy war, the UAE and Iran are also engaged in a territory dispute – and not gonna lie, it feels like it’s right out of the South China Sea. For decades, the UAE has been challenging Iran’s control over three islands in the Persian Gulf, called Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. Iranian forces took control over the islands when the British left in 1971, but the UAE claims that the British already gave the islands to them. 

If you take a look at the map we have provided, you’ll see that these islands are almost equidistant from Iran and the Emirates – and the proximity of these islands makes this dispute even more contentious.

RAMYA:

That being said, their relationship has not gone past the point of no return. And a large part of that has to do with their economies. Listeners, we’ve mentioned this concept a lot in previous episodes, and honestly – we’ll probably keep bringing it up, because it’s an important pattern in modern geopolitics. 

Strategically, the UAE and Iran are not friendly, but economically, they rely upon each other, particularly Iran on the UAE. See, the US sanctions on Iran have totally crippled its economy, and Iran has lost over 80% of its buyers market for goods like oil and pistachios. 

The UAE, however, has stuck around and continues to buy Iranian oil to the tune of almost $3b since 2018, which was when the US sanctions hit. In response, the US sanctioned 5 Emirati companies that facilitated the purchase. 

RYAN:

Now, the UAE doesn’t want to be in the US’s shit list, especially for helping Iran. In fact, the UAE would gladly sacrifice its relationship with Iran for a better relationship with the US, because a better trade relationship with the US could totally replace the current economic benefits that Iran is providing. 

Also, the UAE wants to stay ahead of Iran militarily, and a close relationship with the US would mean a steady stream of US military tech and intelligence that would solve that problem. 

HUNTER:

I’m glad you mentioned that, because The UAE’s need for a closer relationship with the US leads us back to the Abraham Accord. As Israel’s annexation plan stalled on the necessary paperwork to make it official, the UAE basically stepped in and decided that they would become Israel’s “in” with the other Arab states, in order to get closer to the US. To sweeten the deal, the US, led by Jared Kushner, offered the UAE access to premier US military tech that no other Middle Eastern state has (besides Israel), mainly the F-35, the most advanced stealth fighter jet in the world.  

HUNTER:

Now that we’ve laid out the background, let’s talk about the deal itself. In essence, it’s a quid pro quo deal: Israel agrees to postpone its annexation plan in exchange for full diplomatic normalization with the UAE. Two questions arise from that. First, what exactly does postpone mean in this context? Second, what is normalization?

RAMYA:

I’ll start with the first question. In this particular case, there’s nothing tricky about the language being used. “Postponed” just means “delayed until further notice” – but, that actually has huge ramifications for the future. Israel can resume its annexation plans whenever it wants – but, of course, there would be severe diplomatic blowback and would ostensibly undo this current deal. 

Still, it’s honestly monumental that Israel only had to postpone its plans as supposed to completely canceling them and cementing a two state solution, which the Gulf States have wanted for over 60 years. But now, the precedent has been broken, and there’s no going back. 

RYAN:

I’ll take the second question. So you asked “what is normalization?”

So, normalization is the process of establishing, well, normal relations between countries. Now the question is how do we define normal relations. At its most basic, normal relations means having diplomats stationed in embassies in each other’s countries. That’s it. 

But, generally a lot more comes with it – because see, having diplomats actively communicating and cooperating creates the potential for enhanced economic opportunities, intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and so on etc. 

So basically, Israel and the UAE have agreed to view each other as friendly, and now they’ll reap the benefits of that friendship. For example, the two are still in talks to list businesses in their stock markets, and to cooperate on increased coronavirus research, tourism opportunities, and much more. 

RAMYA:

So you mean that Israeli companies are able to list themselves in Dubai’s stock market, and vice versa, correct?

RYAN:

Exactly. Now there will be, for example, direct flights from Tel Aviv to Abu Dhabi for the first time. 

HUNTER:

That’s really interesting because for most of the past 60 years you weren’t allowed to take a direct flight from Israel to any of the countries in the gulf, and Israeli citizens are effectively banned from visiting these countries.

RAMYA:

Would you say this changes things?

HUNTER:

Absolutely. Like the idea that an Israeli businessman could go to Dubai or vice

versa would have been impossible before this. I know when I was visiting the emirates and kuwait, you would have been stopped just for having an israeli entry stamp in your passport.

RYAN:

Obviously this changes things, but a lot of diplomacy has to deal with optics, especially how these negotiations play to these countries’ home audiences. How was the deal portrayed in both Israel and the UAE?

RAMYA:

In Israel, Netanyahu announced the deal and paraded it as a “breakthrough” towards a new future in the Middle East. Which makes sense – I mean, if you look at the previous Prime Ministers of Israel, like Shimon Peres for example – he held the belief that the only path to normalization with Arab states would be the two state solution. Israel under Netanyahu managed to take a step towards peace with the surrounding Arab nations without being forced to adopt the two state solution. Netanyahu’s reputation has been in the dumps for a while, so, of course, Netanyahu is gonna play it up as much as possible.

On the flip side, Netanyahu’s counterpart in the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed, downplayed the deal. Instead, he chose to focus on what Israel had to give up. His first words in the announcement were, “an agreement was made to stop further Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories”. The UAE is still an Arab state, and Israel is still the black sheep of the Middle East. So even though their relations are normalized, the UAE isn’t going to act like best friends with Israel. If anything, that really demonstrates how much this deal is about short term benefits and sticking it to Iran, and not really that much about bringing peace to the region. 

WINNERS AND LOSERS

HUNTER:

So I think the best way to analyze this deal is to look at who wins and who loses. Guys, who are the winners and losers here?

RYAN:

Sure, let’s do it. Let’s start with the two parties involved in the actual Accord. 

So, Israel comes out of this with a big win. Finally, after years and years of Arab-Israeli conflict, the possibility of normalizing relations with other gulf states, Syria and Lebanon is on the table, without having to carry out a two state solution. Also, the deal will help Netanyahu’s reputation tremendously, even though his “backtracking” on annexing the West Bank has angered a lot of Israeli right-wingers.

RAMYA:

Absolutely. And not only is this a huge win for Israel politically, but the newly brokered peace creates economic opportunities that were not there before. Most importantly, Israel will have a more reliable source of oil than its previous source, which was Kurdish oil from Iraq that came in through Turkey. The current Turkish government headed by President Erdogan has been vocally against Israel, and Iraq is often influenced by Iran, so you can see how that could be an issue.  

Also, Israel’s economy could use some investments from the Emirates. Israel is often called a startup nation because of its skilled workforce and massive software industry. In fact, I’m pretty sure Israel’s, you know, equivalent to our “Silicon Valley” is called “Silicon Wadi.” So the Emiratis have plenty to invest in, and Israel’s economy would only benefit from Emirati money. 

RYAN:

Yep. And Ramya, you just mentioned that Israel’s got a skilled workforce. So the deal is good, because the Emirates will become a new destination for Israeli professionals, particularly engineers – if you think about it, many and/or all of them have served in their military and many of them have the benefit of training in these fields. The Emirates is full of foreign professionals – approximately 89% of residents in the U.A.E are immigrants and expatriates. Dubai is the perfect example. 

RAMYA:

Very true. I know several people, both Indian and American, who live in Dubai for work. So now I think we should move onto the Emirates. 

RYAN:

Right. So politically, I would say the Emirates takes home a pretty big prize with this deal too. By signing the Accord, the UAE is moving closer to the US – which means that they can now purchase the highly coveted F-35’s and other cutting edge US military tech that wasn’t available to them before.

It’s interesting to mention the F-35 sale because Israel and Netanyahu are staunchly against it, even though it got them normalization without a two state solution. But it does make sense, since it devalues Israel’s F-35’s, previously the only F-35’s in the Middle East, which does a number on Israel’s military advantage. And Israel needs that advantage because it has no permanent allies around it. 

RAMYA:

So that means that if the UAE acquires F-35s, the only other state in the region that would have it would be Israel.

RYAN:

Oh yeah. F-35’s under UAE control could shift the balance of power in the region, especially in places like Yemen. But that’s a best case scenario for the UAE, which will take time and effort from both the UAE and the US before that reality can be achieved. It’s not like the UAE will get those F-35’s tomorrow, you know what I mean? And even then, they need the US to train Emirati pilots how to fly them, and train the engineers how to maintain them and troubleshoot the software, then those pilots need enough experience to actually become a threat. If the Trump administration, or the potential Biden administration, at any point during that process wants to backtrack on the F-35’s, the Emiratis would have a difficult time making the most out of them themselves because they’d lose all the comforts of interoperability with the US. But, while it will take some time, effort, and a lot of luck, it’s one of the few options the UAE has for improving its seat at the table in the region. 

RAMYA:

I’m glad you brought up balance of power because there’s definitely a downside in this deal for the UAE, which is the possibility of alienating its neighbors. Saudi Arabia has already come out and stated that it would never normalize relations with Israel without an independent Palestinian state in place, and its likely that the other Arab states in the Gulf and the Levant will follow suit. It’s tough to say whether that is true anger or if it’s just rhetoric to help get the best deal.

RYAN:

I mean, It wouldn’t be surprising if other Arab states are thinking now, “If the UAE can get F-35’s from the US for normalizing relations with Israel, what could I get?”. Whether they’re mad or not is honestly up to Saudi Arabia. Really, whatever they decide, the rest of the gulf will follow them, since they’re the most powerful and connected Sunni state in the Middle East. We’ll talk about Saudi Arabia in a bit. 

But a really dangerous possibility for the UAE to consider is an increase of terrorist threats and attacks, both Sunni and Shia, as these radical terrorist groups often all agree about hating Israel and anyone who supports it. So acts of terror are, unfortunately, on the table. The deal will also increase Iran’s anger towards the UAE – the relationship is already tenuous and honestly only a little short of hostile. The UAE may end up facing retaliation from Iran in Yemen. However, I believe the UAE is willing to pay that price in order to establish a closer relationship with the US and economic ties with Israel. 

HUNTER:

Alright so we covered Israel and the Emirates. Now let’s talk about Iran, the boogeyman that draws the ire of both countries. So how does Iran shape up in the aftermath of this deal?

RYAN:

Iran has definitely taken a hit. But overall, their position is relatively the same as before the deal. 

The most significant change that would be troublesome for Iran is the potential of F-35’s being on the UAE – Saudi Arabia side of the Yemen conflict. But like we said earlier, it’ll take time before that will come to fruition. And it may not even happen! If it were to happen though, Iran would have a really tough time dealing with the stealth capabilities of the F-35, and it would be in real danger of completely losing air superiority over Yemen. 

RAMYA:

Iran could also be in even more dire economic straits, since the UAE has been one of the few countries left willing to buy Iranian oil and deal with the US’s ire. But that may be changing with the UAE’s shift towards the US and Israel. 

Iran would be losing out on around $1b worth of oil sales a year, which is a significant portion of their market at this point.  But, there’s always the chance that the UAE will try to play both sides of the table for even more rewards – it has worked so far, after all. So Iran could be facing some troubles in Yemen soon, but otherwise the calculus of their position in the Middle East is relatively the same. It could even score some points with Israel haters across the region for being one of the only Muslim nations to still openly stand against Israel. 

HUNTER:

So here’s what we’re all wondering. Who is the biggest loser in this deal? Is it Iran?

RYAN:

The biggest loser of this whole deal though is not Iran – its the Palestinian people. In fact, the UAE made an agreement in 2002 at the Arab Peace Initiative to never normalize with Israel without a two state solution in place, which it just violated with this deal. So now that the UAE has reneged on that agreement, it sends a message to other countries in the Middle East that it’s ok to normalize relations with Israel without holding them to a two state solution, and that they may even get an F-35 from the US for their troubles. With a precedent like that in place, the idea of a two state solution ever coming to be seems further away than ever before, which is just backbreaking to the Palestinian Authority and people. The worst part of this is that there’s really nothing they can do to change it.

HUNTER: Is it true that the US and the Trump administration did a lot of the diplomatic heavy lifting in getting this deal done? What’s the payoff for the US? 

RAMYA:

That’s true. The last time there was an Arab-Israeli peace deal like this was the Israel-Jordan Treaty in 1994 under US President Bill Clinton. So, the Trump administration has earned one of its few true diplomatic wins. And that’s no small feat for any administration. The Abraham Accord is definitely on trend for the US’s maximum pressure policy on Iran, which has been in place since 2018. So facilitating a deal to help its pal Israel get closer to the UAE AND stick it to Iran shows a cohesion in foreign policy that this administration hasn’t really demonstrated before. 

RYAN:

Absolutely. And here’s the catch: selling F-35s to the UAE has both upset Israel and may destabilize the region in the coming years. It’s not like the UAE is a completely trustworthy ally – I mean, they’ve been buying Iranian oil in defiance of US sanctions for years now. And in the future, if conflict were to break out in the Middle East, the UAE possessing F-35s could come back to bite the US in the ass. What if the normalization proves to be wildly unpopular in Abu Dhabi and within a few years Israel and the UAE are in the same place they were in before the deal? It’s something the US needs to keep in mind throughout this process. In this current moment, though, it must be said that the Trump administration scored a win on the Abraham Accord. 

HUNTER:

We’ve mentioned Saudi Arabia a few times, how does this deal affect their position? 

RAMYA:

Well… I mean… this isn’t a great moment for the kingdom, but it could turn into an opportunity down the line. Right now, Saudi Arabia is taking a hit to its self-proclaimed reputation as defenders of Sunni Islam and the Palestinian cause, because the Palestinians are getting thrown under the bus and all Saudi Arabia can do is wag their finger at the UAE and Israel. 

But that finger wagging might be indicative of a potential change in the Saudi agenda, in the form of crown prince Mohammed bin Salman. His father, the current king Salman Abdulaziz, is a staunch enemy of Israel, while the crown prince is more ambivalent and willing to go further in search of power and profit. As long as King Salman is alive, Saudi Arabia will never normalize relations with Israel – but as soon as the crown prince takes over, things may change. As of right now, the king is 84 and not in the greatest health, so it is possible the change may come sooner rather than later. If that happens, we can expect Saudi Arabia to lobby the US for F-35’s of its own, which would make things even more troublesome for Iran and Israel. 

HUNTER:

Let’s look at the big picture. What Does This Mean For the future of diplomacy in the Middle East?

RYAN:

Well to me it signals one thing very clearly: that there has been a shift in perceptions about a two state solution and how necessary it is for Middle Eastern diplomacy. The Abraham Accord has made it quite clear that the plight of the Palestinians is not as relevant to the current generation of Arab leaders as it was to the older generations, with Saudi King Salman as one of the last holdouts. This shift means that most countries, including the ones we mentioned in this episode, will just take this deal in stride, and it even may trigger other deals in the future along the same lines. Look to countries like Bahrain and Oman first, and then maybe Saudi Arabia later on with the rise of the crown prince to the throne. 

RAMYA:

And that scenario of the Middle East isn’t any more peaceful than it is right now, so it’s important to understand that this deal will not usher in a new age of peace or anything remotely close to that. Really, the Abraham Accord was about bringing an informal relationship to a new stage of formality, with the goal of cooperating to stick it to Iran. More countries will normalize relations with Israel if it helps them counter Iran and get closer to the US, and maybe to bolster their economies. In essence, this is what diplomacy truly is: it’s hard, slow work that may take years, and if it does work out there may be only small gains, but that’s better than toiling by yourself for even less. In geopolitics, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” really does play out on the world stage, and it might not be pretty but it’s effective. 

OUTRO:

That’s it for our show today. If you liked this episode don’t forget to rate and subscribe on Itunes, Spotify, or however you’re listening. We are actively looking for sponsors and advertisers, so if your organization wants to support what we do, please reach out to us at geopoliticsrundown@gmail.com or on our website, geopoliticsrundown.com. As always thank you for tuning in, this has been geopolitics…rundown.

Leave a Reply